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AIRBNB IN NEW YORK CITY:
WHOSE PRIVACY RIGHTS ARE THREATENED
BY A GOVERNMENT DATA GRAB?
Tess Hofmann*
New York City regulators have vigorously resisted the rise of Airbnb as an
alternative to traditional hotels, characterizing “home sharing” as a trend
that is sucking up permanent housing in a city already facing an affordability
crisis. However, laws banning short-term rentals have done little to
discourage this practice, as Airbnb’s policy of keeping user information
private makes it possible for illegal operators to evade law enforcement.
Frustrated by this power imbalance, the New York City Council passed Local
Law 146, which requires Airbnb to provide city officials with access to the
names and information of its home sharing hosts on a monthly basis to assist
with law enforcement efforts. Airbnb claims that the ordinance is a flagrant
violation of its own privacy rights and the rights of its customers.
Local Law 146 is the culmination of the regulatory struggle over Airbnb
in New York City, but it is also a flash point for government data-collection
efforts generally. Because of the massive potential of using private
companies’ data to aid in law enforcement efforts, the implementation of
data-collection statutes could be an attractive policing tool. Using Local
Law 146 as a lens, this Note examines the privacy issues implicated by datacollection laws and discusses which parties can assert these privacy rights,
particularly given recent changes in third-party doctrine jurisprudence.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that, while the outcome of Airbnb’s challenge
to Local Law 146 will be an important indicator, the suit will not resolve the
question of whether individual Airbnb hosts could successfully challenge this
law without the support of the company. Individual challenges to sweeping
data-collection statutes could be the next frontier in breaking down the thirdparty doctrine’s barrier to Fourth Amendment protections.

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., B.S., 2012, Boston
University. Thank you to my Note advisor, Professor Nestor Davidson, whose advice
improved this piece immeasurably, as well as to my colleagues on the Fordham Law Review
for their time and helpful edits, especially Katie McMahon. Thank you also to my parents for
their encouragement and to Beau for his support.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment,1 originally enacted to protect against trespass in
the home by police,2 today also safeguards troves of online data from being
commandeered by the government as a superpowered law enforcement tool.
In New York City, classic home-based privacy concerns have dovetailed

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004).
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with online data privacy concerns in a struggle over the regulation of
Airbnb.3
The rise of Airbnb and fellow “home sharing” websites, which allow users
to list spaces to rent for overnight stays,4 has been met with a cascade of
regulation in New York City.5 Opponents of home sharing, including the
New York City Council, claim the practice exacerbates the dearth of
affordable housing for city residents by removing potential full-time rentals
from the market,6 creates nuisances in peaceful residential buildings where
full-time residents do not expect a constant stream of strangers,7 and
potentially exposes short-term renters to dangerous conditions in regular
apartments that are not outfitted to the same standards as legal hotel rooms.8
The city’s latest salvo is Local Law 146, an ordinance effectively requiring
home sharing sites to hand over all user records on a monthly basis so that
city agents automatically have the information needed to enforce local short-

3. Throughout this Note, Airbnb is sometimes used as a catchall term for home sharing
service providers. Airbnb is the market leader in home sharing. Expedia, which owns
HomeAway, ranks second. See Riley McDermid, With HomeAway Growing Like Crazy,
Expedia Closes in on Airbnb for Market Share, AUSTIN BUS. J. (July 25, 2017, 1:45 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2017/07/25/with-homeaway-growing-like-crazyexpedia-closes-in.html [https://perma.cc/BP5U-C74Q].
4. Airbnb is an online platform that allows users to advertise and rent out extra rooms or
entire homes for short-term periods and provides a system for leaving ratings and reviews of
those rentals. See How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/13/how-do-reviews-work [https://perma.cc/C88M-PCFX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019);
How to Start Hosting, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/b/setup [https://perma.cc/X9YVYPDX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). The service boasts a global reach. Brian Solomon, How
Airbnb Expanded to 190 Countries by Thinking ‘Glocal,’ FORBES (May 3, 2016, 2:30 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/05/03/how-airbnb-expanded-to-190countries-by-thinking-glocal/#5aca6fcf7e91 [https://perma.cc/GM4H-758U].
5. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues over New Law Regulating New York Rentals,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-yorkpasses-law-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/3YU9-8YBU]; Katie Honan, New York City Council
Passes Bill to Regulate Airbnb, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/new-york-city-council-passes-bill-to-regulate-airbnb-1531952763 [https://perma.cc/
2SGX-CTVR]; S. Jhoanna Robledo, Hey, Wanna Rent My Couch?, N.Y. MAG.
(Nov. 27, 2011), http://nymag.com/realestate/realestatecolumn/short-term-rentals-2011-12/
[https://perma.cc/H284-NZVJ].
6. See BUREAU OF BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, THE IMPACT OF
AIRBNB ON NYC RENTS 1 (2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/AirBnB_050318.pdf [https://perma.cc/84FK-SG3R]; see also Luis FerréSadurní, To Curb Illegal Airbnbs, New York City Wants to Collect Data on Hosts, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/nyregion/illegal-airbnb-new-yorkcity-bill.html [https://perma.cc/7Y2U-W5DM]. But cf. Robert McClendon, MIT Professor
Skeptical of Airbnb’s Impact on New Orleans Housing Prices, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 22,
2015), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/09/mit_professor_skeptical_of_air.html
[https://perma.cc/6TPR-ZXJB] (questioning the popular opinion that Airbnb rentals drive up
housing costs).
7. See MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, A10008, St. Assemb., 233d Legis.
Sess. (N.Y. 2010), https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A10008&
term=2009&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Memo=Y [https://perma.cc/BH7G-AGRY].
8. Id.
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term rental laws.9 Airbnb sued the city over the ordinance and won a
preliminary injunction against its enactment.10 An interlocutory appeal is
now pending before the Second Circuit.11 In its lawsuit, Airbnb characterizes
the law as a gross overreach and claims it is illegal under the Fourth
Amendment administrative search doctrine and the Stored Communications
Act.12 In defense, the city argues that Airbnb is asserting rights that belong
to its customers, whose privacy rights are nonexistent in this circumstance
under the third-party doctrine.13
This Note explores whether Local Law 146 is a viable mechanism for
stopping violations of New York City’s short-term rental laws perpetuated
by Airbnb hosts, or whether this law violates the privacy rights of Airbnb,
the hosts who use home sharing sites to rent their homes, or both. Part I
discusses the history of regulating home sharing in New York State and New
York City. Part II discusses the privacy concerns potentially implicated by
Local Law 146. Part III lays out the privacy arguments made by Airbnb in
its recent lawsuit and explains how the Southern District of New York
evaluated these arguments. Part IV suggests that courts should recognize the
Fourth Amendment rights of individual Airbnb hosts who are affected by this
law or similar laws in the future, despite the third-party doctrine.
I. NEW YORK CITY’S PROTECTIONIST POLICIES AND AIRBNB’S RESPONSE
There is a conflict brewing in New York City between Airbnb, regulators,
and the hotel industry. This Part explores how ineffectual short-term rental
laws prompted the New York City Council to pass Local Law 146 and
examines several other cities’ data-sharing laws.
A. The Problem of Airbnb in New York City
After hearing excessive barking, residents of a building decide to complain
to their landlord that a neighbor is operating an illegal kennel from his
apartment through dog-sitting gigs found on Rover.com. The landlord is
busy and unconcerned, so the residents report it to the local buildings
department, and the neighbor subsequently gets a notice from the code
enforcer. The entrepreneurial neighbor would then have time to reconsider
9. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 26-2101 to -2105 (2019). The uncodified
version of this municipal law was Local Law 146, and this Note uses that popular name to
refer to this legislation.
10. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE),
2019 WL 91990, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan. 31,
2019).
11. Id.; Notice of Appeal at 1, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE),
18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 93.
12. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New
York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Airbnb Complaint].
13. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for a Preliminary
Injunction at 7–9, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742
(PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No. 27 [hereinafter NYC Memo in
Opposition].
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his position and take on fewer dogs the next week, hopefully never interfering
with his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of their apartments again.
This hypothetical presents the typical lifecycle of a residential code
violation—housing maintenance codes are enforced on an ad hoc basis.14
But what if, rather than waiting for complaints, New York City made
commercial dog-sitting in an apartment a fineable offense, and then required
Rover.com to disclose all of its records to the government each month? This
solution would likely be effective, but would it strike the proper balance
between privacy and law enforcement?
This tactic is the one that New York City has tried to adopt in dealing with
Airbnb and other home sharing services. The prospect of passively renting
extra space to tourists has proven popular among New Yorkers. In its court
filings, Airbnb admits that as, of June 1, 2018, there were approximately
28,000 “entire home” Airbnb listings in New York City, which represents
about 0.8 percent of New York City homes.15 As of March 2019, there were
over 47,000 Airbnb listings in the city, including over 23,000 entire homes,
according to Inside Airbnb, a website that analyzes publicly available
information about Airbnb.16 Airbnb’s immense popularity, combined with a
historically passive approach to policing illegal building use, have created
novel problems in New York City housing code enforcement.
B. The History of the Battle Between Airbnb and New York Regulators
While cities like San Francisco have opted to legitimize the business of
Airbnb rentals by creating processes through which hosts register with the
municipality,17 New York has outright banned short-term rentals of
apartments.18 The one major exception is that New York hosts can rent space
within their homes if they are present at the same time as the guest—offering
just a room or rooms rather than an entire private home.19 In 2010, the New
York State Legislature enacted a new law prohibiting the rental of units in
14. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., THE ABCS OF HOUSING: HOUSING RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR OWNERS AND TENANTS 3 (2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/portal/apps/311

_literatures/HPD/ABCs-housing-singlepg.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ92-WWKG] (explaining
the process for tenants to report housing code violations); Illegal Building Conversion or
Occupancy Complaint, NYC.GOV, https://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/1891/illegalbuilding-conversion-or-occupancy-complaint [https://perma.cc/52Q8-E8E4] (last visited Apr.
10, 2019) (providing a complaint form for residents to report illegal conversions).
15. See Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 4.
16. New York City, INSIDE AIRBNB, http://insideairbnb.com/new-york-city/
[https://perma.cc/U8RK-YFXR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
17. See San Francisco, CA, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/871/sanfrancisco--ca [https://perma.cc/NTA9-CTD2] (last updated Aug. 28, 2017).
18. See Illegal Short-Term Rentals, N.Y.C. OFF. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/specialenforcement/enforcement/illegal-short-term-rentals.page
[https://perma.cc/SWT4-KV2Z] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
19. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8)(a) (McKinney 2019); see also Abe Carrey,
Appeal Nos. 1300602, 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl. Control Bd. 2013), http://archive.citylaw.org/
ecb/Long%20Form%20Orders/2013/1300602---1300736.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9HNPNHQ] (affirming the legality of hosting a paying guest while the permanent resident remains
in the home).
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Class A multiple dwellings for fewer than thirty days.20 Class A multiple
dwellings are residential buildings with three or more units, as opposed to
Class B multiple dwellings, which encompass hotels, boarding houses, and
dormitories.21 In 2016, the New York State Legislature passed another law
that made it illegal to advertise apartments for short-term rental and created
civil penalties escalating from $1000 for a first violation to $7500 for
repeated violations.22 These two laws together have earned New York City
a reputation as the American city most hostile to Airbnb.23
The hotel industry has also inserted itself into the fight against Airbnb in
New York City.24 The American Hotel and Lodging Association, spurred by
home sharing services cutting into its customer base,25 has launched a
“multipronged, national campaign approach at the local, state and federal
level” aimed at minimizing Airbnb’s reach.26 Airbnb and hotel industry
groups have traded barbs—with the Hotel Association of New York City
once suggesting that Airbnb rentals could expose residents to transient
terrorists,27 and Airbnb promoting the idea that it is good for the city28 and
suggesting that city council members are corrupted by hotel industry
campaign donations.29 This rhetoric aside, city regulators and the hotel lobby
have found themselves on the same side of the fight against Airbnb.

20. MULT. DWELL. § 4(8)(a).
21. See id. § 4(8)–(9).
22. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2019).
23. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 249 (2016); J. T. Minor, Note, Foregoing the
Cleaver for the Scalpel: How New York Can Add Some Nuance to Its Short-Term Rental
Laws, 103 IOWA L. REV. 817, 831 (2018); Nick Tabor, Is New York Cracking Down on Airbnb
to Help Local Residents or Hotels?, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 13, 2018), http://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2018/08/airbnb-new-york-crack-down.html [https://perma.cc/B3TV-XMRK].
24. See Will Bredderman, Hotels Target Airbnb in Mail and Ad Blitz, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS.
(Apr.
6,
2018,
12:00
AM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20180406/
REAL_ESTATE/180409933/hotels-target-airbnb-in-mail-and-ad-blitz [https://perma.cc/9A
4A-Z8H6]; Jake Offenhartz, Hotel Industry Releases Attack Ad Accusing Airbnb of Enabling
Terrorists, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 1, 2017, 9:27 AM), http://gothamist.com/2017/08/01/
airbnb_terrorism_ad.php [https://perma.cc/GCD8-P82N].
25. Dina Gerdeman, The Airbnb Effect: Cheaper Rooms for Travelers, Less Revenue for
Hotels, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2018, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
hbsworkingknowledge/2018/02/27/the-airbnb-effect-cheaper-rooms-for-travelers-lessrevenue-for-hotels/ [https://perma.cc/MP9N-TF9D].
26. Katie Benner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-planto-combat-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/9MCJ-VK8U].
27. Kenneth Lovett, New York City’s Hotel Industry Links Airbnb to Terror in Harsh Ad,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 31, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/newyork-city-hotel-industry-links-airbnb-terror-harsh-ad-article-1.3370202 [https://perma.cc/Y9
JF-GQVQ].
28. Jack Smith IV, Airbnb’s Latest Subway Propaganda Reminds You That You Love,
Support Airbnb, OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://observer.com/
2014/08/airbnbs-latest-subway-propaganda-reminds-you-that-you-love-support-airbnb/
[https://perma.cc/JUP4-3KPG].
29. Joe Anuta, Airbnb Questions Hotel Union’s Campaign Contributions to City Council
Members, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (June 22, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/
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In 2014, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman attempted to
subpoena comprehensive host data from Airbnb for all New York State hosts
as part of an investigation into potential violations of short-term rental laws.30
Airbnb succeeded in getting the subpoena quashed as overbroad, since it
asked for the information of all New York State hosts despite the fact that the
short-term rental laws do not apply to cities with fewer than 325,000
citizens.31 Soon after, Airbnb agreed to release anonymized data on hosts,
with names and addresses stripped, which Schneiderman would have one
year to review.32 Under the agreement, if the investigation revealed
suspicious illegal activity, Airbnb would have to turn over the hosts’
identifying details,33 which Airbnb ultimately did for 124 hosts.34 From that
point forward, Airbnb also agreed to require New York State hosts to view a
warning about the short-term rental laws and applicable taxes prior to listing
their space.35
In 2015, Airbnb tried to increase transparency and collaboration with law
enforcement by announcing a commitment to “provide cities with the
information they need to make informed decisions about home sharing
policies” in a mission statement titled the Airbnb Community Compact.36 In
conjunction with this statement, the company voluntarily released a trove of
anonymized data on New York City hosts, including statistics like host
earnings, types of listings, and how often hosts rent their spaces.37
This cooperation did not last long. In 2016, Airbnb filed suit against
Schneiderman and the City of New York over the amendments to the city
and state laws making advertisement of short-term rentals a fineable
Airbnb claimed that these amendments violated the
offense.38
Communications Decency Act of 1996 by making the company liable for
third-party postings on its platform.39 That suit was settled in just two
months, with the City promising that only hosts would be held responsible

article/20180622/REAL_ESTATE/180629966/on-the-offensive-airbnb-questions-hotelunion-s-campaign-contributions-to-city-council-members [https://perma.cc/S369-AK5R].
30. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790–91 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
31. Id. at 791–92.
32. David Streitfeld, Airbnb Will Hand Over Host Data to New York, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/technology/airbnb-will-hand-over-hostdata-to-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/P6WJ-56CK].
33. Id.
34. Pui-Wing Tam & Christie Smythe, Airbnb Turns Over Data on Top New York City
Hosts to State Attorney General, SKIFT (Aug. 23, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://skift.com/
2014/08/23/airbnb-turns-over-data-on-top-new-york-city-hosts-to-state-attorney-general/
[https://perma.cc/GFP8-3T2Q].
35. Streitfeld, supra note 32.
36. See
The
Airbnb
Community
Compact,
AIRBNB
CITIZEN,
https://www.airbnbcitizen.com/community-compact/ [https://perma.cc/B4EK-N9KX] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2019).
37. Mike Isaac, Airbnb Releases Trove of New York City Home-Sharing Data, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/airbnb-releases-trove-ofnew-york-city-home-sharing-data.html [https://perma.cc/1QT7-R3CH].
38. Benner, supra note 5.
39. Id.
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and fined, rather than Airbnb.40 In its notice of dismissal, Airbnb vowed to
continue to work cooperatively with the city on ways to address the
permanent housing shortage, and the company committed to encourage its
hosts’ compliance with Airbnb’s “One Host, One Home”41 policy.42 Despite
this promise, the city has struggled to enforce hosts’ compliance with its
short-term rental regulations.
C. Enforcement Issues
Passing clear-cut legislation is one thing, but actually enforcing these
provisions when the illegal activity takes place inside private homes has
proven quite difficult.43 Because Airbnb does not display the real names and
addresses of its hosts on its website, New York City agents are stymied, as
they cannot access a comprehensive list of Airbnb hosts in the city.44 Like
the code enforcer checking on the dog-sitter,45 city officials are confined to
traditional investigative tactics: following tips from complaining neighbors,
knocking on doors and asking questions, and occasionally staking out
suspicious buildings with video cameras.46 The city has reportedly even used
leads generated by private investigators paid by the hotel lobby.47 These
inspections have led Airbnb48 and its hosts49 to accuse city agents of
harassment.
In addition to being irksome to hosts and guests, the process of
investigating tens of thousands of potential illegal rentals using these tactics
40. Katie Benner, Airbnb Ends Fight with New York City over Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/technology/airbnb-ends-fight-with-new-yorkcity-over-fines.html [https://perma.cc/5RJ5-EC7H].
41. See generally One Host, One Home: New York City (January 2019 Update), AIRBNB
1 (2019), https://2sqy5r1jf93u30kwzc1smfqt-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/One-Host-One-Home-_-January-2019-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B3W-JWF6]
(providing information on the percentage of New York City Airbnb hosts with only one entire
home listing available).
42. NY Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal at 2, Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, No.
16-cv-8239 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2016), ECF No. 32.
43. See Jennifer Peltz, The Team Tasked with Snooping Out Illegal Hotels and Airbnb
Listings in NYC, SKIFT (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://skift.com/2015/03/30/the-teamtasked-with-snooping-out-illegal-hotels-and-airbnb-hosts-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/S2AL263Z].
44. See Declaration of Christian Klossner in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for a
Preliminary Injunction at 13, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18
Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Klossner Declaration].
45. See supra Part I.A.
46. See Peltz, supra note 43.
47. Josh Eidelson, Hotel Money Is Funding Anti-Airbnb Sting Operations, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 12, 2017, 6:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201707-12/hotel-money-is-funding-anti-airbnb-sting-operations [https://perma.cc/9P5N-XXFL].
48. Sally Goldenberg, New York City Poised to Join Airbnb Crackdown, POLITICO (May
15, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/05/14/
new-york-city-poised-to-join-others-in-cracking-down-on-airbnb-418835 [https://perma.cc/
BM4X-3AXE].
49. Christopher Robbins, Airbnb Host Sues City After Receiving $32K in Fines,
GOTHAMIST
(July
18,
2018,
2:08
PM),
http://gothamist.com/2018/07/18/
airbnb_nyc_lawsuit_fines.php [https://perma.cc/97TM-DKFY].
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is resource intensive.50 But rather than surrender, New York City has
devoted increasing resources to enforcing the laws.51 In a 2016 executive
order, Mayor Bill de Blasio recast the mission of the Office of Special
Enforcement (OSE), a city agency once focused on issues including the sale
of counterfeit goods and prostitution,52 to focus on enforcing the prohibition
against advertising short-term rentals.53 OSE conducted over 3500
inspections in 2017, up from 1695 inspections in 2016.54 According to
Christian Klossner, the executive director of OSE, the agency’s enforcement
capabilities have been outpaced by a massive increase in short-term rental
listings.55
Despite OSE’s efforts, the presence of illegal inventory on Airbnb has
persisted. A 2014 report by the state attorney general’s office found that 72
percent of units booked as short-term rentals on Airbnb violated the ban on
renting entire homes for fewer than thirty days.56 A 2016 report from
Housing Conservation Coordinators and MFY Legal Services found that 56
percent of Airbnb’s New York City listings were likely illegal.57 A McGill
University report in 2018 found that illegal listings account for
approximately 42 to 46 percent of all active New York City Airbnb listings,
which comprises 66 percent of all host revenue,58 and that Airbnb has
removed between 7000 and 13,500 units of housing from New York City’s
long-term rental market.59 Helpless to enforce the existing laws, the New
York City Council adopted a creative solution.

50. See Rosa Goldensohn, De Blasio Ramps Up Airbnb Enforcement, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS.
(Apr. 26, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20170426/
REAL_ESTATE/170429915/mayor-bill-de-blasio-budgets-1-6-million-to-crack-down-onairbnb [https://perma.cc/F399-KVZN] (discussing the city’s expansion of the Office of
Special Enforcement from thirty-two to forty-eight staffers).
51. See id.; see also Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 4.
52. See Stu Loeser & Virginia Lam, Mayor Bloomberg Creates the Office of Special
Enforcement to Expand Enforcement Initiatives Across the City and Improve Quality of Life
in All Five Boroughs, NYC.GOV (Dec. 14, 2006), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/434-06/mayor-bloomberg-creates-office-special-enforcement-expandenforcement-initiatives-across [https://perma.cc/M3ZL-F9D6].
53. See CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22, OFFICE OF
SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT—UNLAWFUL ADVERTISEMENTS FOR CERTAIN OCCUPANCIES (2016),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2016/eo_22.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F625-LFYA].
54. See Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 4.
55. See id. at 9.
56. RESEARCH DEP’T & INTERNET BUREAU, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
AIRBNB IN THE CITY 8 (2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5FM-ZAXY].
57. BJH ADVISORS LLC, SHORT CHANGING NEW YORK CITY: THE IMPACT OF AIRBNB ON
NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING MARKET 24 (2016), http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/Shortchanging-NYC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LAE-WFJV].
58. DAVID WACHSMUTH ET AL., MCGILL UNIV., THE HIGH COST OF SHORT-TERM RENTALS
IN NEW YORK CITY 15 (2018), https://mcgill.ca/newsroom/files/newsroom/channels/
attach/airbnb-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H25-NT4T].
59. Id. at 25.
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D. Local Law 146
Faced with the meteoric rise in popularity of short-term rentals with no
slowdown in sight, the New York City Council passed Local Law 146.60 The
council unanimously approved the bill,61 and Mayor Bill de Blasio signed it
into law on August 6, 2018.62 Before being preliminarily enjoined by the
Southern District of New York, the law was set to take effect in February
2019.63
Local Law 146 requires home sharing services such as Airbnb to submit a
monthly report to OSE including the following details of each rental: the
physical address of the premises; the legal name, phone number, email
address, and physical address of the host; the URL of the listing; the number
of the listing; whether the rental involved the entire dwelling or part of the
dwelling; the total number of days it was rented; the amount of fees received
by the booking service; the amount of rent received by the host; and the
anonymized identifier for the account number used by the host to receive
payments or, alternatively, the account name and account number.64 The law
also requires the home sharing service to obtain consent for this disclosure
from its users as a condition of listing their property on the service.65 If
accurate reports are not submitted, the law provides for the home sharing
service to be fined up to $1500 per listing per month.66 According to
Klossner, “The additional information to be provided to the City pursuant to
Local Law 146 will enhance OSE’s research and investigative capabilities
and will provide OSE with the tools needed to effectively and efficiently
combat increasing illegal and unsafe transient use in the City.”67
Airbnb and its competitor HomeAway filed suit against the City of New
York, claiming that the law creates an illegal administrative search.68 As
Airbnb framed the issue before the court: “In short, neither New York City,
nor any other city, nor any state, nor the federal government, has ever tried

60. Honan, supra note 5.
61. Id.
62. Press Release, Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation Regarding the Department of
Correction, Bail Bonds, Senior Centers, and Short Term Rentals (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/398-18/mayor-de-blasio-signs-legislationthe-department-correction-bail-bonds-senior#/0 [https://perma.cc/CEN6-ZDQM].
63. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 26-2101 to -2105 (2019); Airbnb, Inc. v.
City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan. 31, 2019).
64. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 26-2102 (2019).
65. Id.
66. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 26-2104 (2019).
67. Klossner Declaration, supra note 44, at 9.
68. Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 23; Complaint to Declare Invalid and Enjoin
Enforcement of New York City Administrative Code Sections 26-2101–26.2104 at 21,
Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL
91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter HomeAway Complaint]. These lawsuits were
designated as related and assigned to the same judge in the Southern District of New York.
See Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *1 n.1.
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anything like this ever before.”69 The home sharing sites claim that the law
bypasses the usual requirement of a warrant by requiring the sites to turn over
business records on a regular basis without probable cause; thus, the law
violates both their privacy rights and the privacy rights of hosts under the
Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act.70
In January 2019, the district court granted the home sharing sites’ request
for a preliminary injunction of the ordinance and found that the collection of
broad swaths of data absent reasonable suspicion would likely violate the
Fourth Amendment.71 New York City is currently appealing that order
before the Second Circuit.72 The result of the lawsuit could have implications
not only for the city, but also for any municipality seeking data from private
companies to help enforce administrative laws.
E. Data Sharing in Other Cities
This is not the first time that a city has elicited information from home
sharing services to help with law enforcement; it is only the first time that a
city has gone about it in this specific way.
In New Orleans, for example, hosts are required to obtain short-term rental
licenses from the city.73 Airbnb shares a log of its hosts’ anonymized activity
with the city on a monthly basis in accordance with a local statute, and the
city can subpoena personal host information when it has a reasonable belief
that a specific short-term rental is operating illegally.74 In contrast to New
York City, there is no outright ban on short-term rentals in New Orleans.75
Instead, there is a ninety-day annual cap for hosts to rent out entire homes in
residential districts.76
Several other cities have developed approaches to regulate this market.
Chicago requires home sharing platforms to register each listed unit with the
city.77 Home sharing platforms must provide anonymized data on users and
lengths of stay on a bimonthly basis, with the caveat that personalized
information will be provided upon request by subpoena if illegal activity is
suspected.78 Chicago does not have laws banning short-term rentals, but it
69. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at
13, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019
WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Airbnb Memo in Support].
70. See Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 5–6; HomeAway Complaint, supra note 68,
at 5. The lawsuits also allege violations of the First Amendment and the New York State
Constitution, but those claims are beyond the scope of this Note.
71. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *20.
72. Joyce Hanson, NYC Taking Short-Term Rental Rule’s Freeze to 2nd Circ., LAW360
(Feb. 1, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/1124566/nyc-takingshort-term-rental-rule-s-freeze-to-2nd-circ- [https://perma.cc/SBL9-5BL9].
73. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-613(b) (2019).
74. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-620(a)–(b) (2019).
75. Short Term Rental Zoning Restrictions, CITY NEW ORLEANS, https://www.nola.gov/
short-term-rentals/str-zoning-restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/BP3Q-NLWZ] (last updated May
24, 2018).
76. NEW ORLEANS, LA., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE § 21.8.C.14.b (2019).
77. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-14-020 (2018).
78. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-13-240 (2018).
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allows individual precincts with residentially zoned areas to adopt local
ordinances prohibiting additional short-term rentals.79 In Portland, shortterm rentals are allowed, provided that hosts live in their homes for at least
nine months a year80 and obtain a permit from the city.81 San Francisco
requires individuals to apply for an identifying number in the city’s shortterm rental registry82 and submit quarterly reports of activity.83 San
Francisco does not require Airbnb to regularly share data, but it does have
laws specifying that home sharing platforms must maintain personalized host
data for three years and provide it to the city in response to a lawful request.84
These policies illustrate a willingness to accommodate the reality of
Airbnb’s popularity by refraining from banning short-term rentals of
residential apartments while maintaining some limits on and oversight of the
industry.
II. THE PRIVACY CONCERNS IMPLICATED BY LOCAL LAW 146
This Part discusses several distinct privacy questions that Local Law 146
raises, including whether the law constitutes an illegal Fourth Amendment
administrative search, how the third-party doctrine affects a party’s ability to
successfully challenge the law, whether the law is preempted by the Stored
Communications Act, and whether the law offends traditional notions of
privacy in the home. These concerns provide the background for Airbnb and
HomeAway’s challenges to Local Law 146.
A. Fourth Amendment Administrative Search
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.”85 Generally, a government search requires a courtissued warrant, and this warrant requirement guarantees a legal justification
for the search.86 Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable” aside from
“a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”87
Fourth Amendment protection extends to areas in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as Justice John Marshall Harlan discussed
in his influential concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.88 This
expectation is twofold: “[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-17-020 (2018).
PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & CHARTER § 33-207-040(A)(1) (2018).
PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE & CHARTER § 33-207-040(C) (2018).
S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(E)–(F) (2019).
S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(3)(C) (2019).
S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 41A.5(g)(4)(E) (2019).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”89 In Katz, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when law enforcement officers recorded his phone calls from
a telephone booth90 without a warrant.91 Despite the semi-public nature of
the phone booth, the defendant could reasonably expect that his calls were
private.92
However, warrantless searches are sometimes allowed where
“special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable”93 or the primary purpose of the search is “distinguishable
from the general interest in crime control.”94 Special needs searches directed
toward a purpose other than crime control—usually compliance with health
and safety regulations—are known as administrative searches.95
The administrative search doctrine originated in the 1967 Supreme Court
decision Camara v. Municipal Court.96 In Camara, the Court found that a
San Francisco ordinance authorizing building inspectors to determine
compliance with the housing code would be permissible only if there was a
reasonable government interest97 that was balanced against the invasion of a
citizen’s privacy.98 In the case of the building-inspection regime, citizens
could either consent to a search (the majority response), or, in the absence of
consent, inspectors could obtain a warrant.99 While a search warrant can
generally only be obtained by showing probable cause that evidence is
located in a particular place,100 the Court determined that an administrative
search warrant could properly be issued without reasonable suspicion if the
criteria for inspection are set out in legislative standards.101 For a building
inspection, these standards may include the passage of time, the nature of the
building, or the condition of the entire area.102
Since Camara, warrantless administrative searches have proliferated.
Common forms of administrative searches include familiar processes such as
checkpoint vehicle searches103 and inspections of businesses in particular
industries.104
89. Id.
90. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 356–58.
92. Id. at 352–53.
93. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
94. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
95. See G. S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3
(2018).
96. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
97. Id. at 539.
98. Id. at 537.
99. Id. at 539–40.
100. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
101. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
102. Id.
103. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
104. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311–13 (1972).
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In addition, certain “closely regulated industries”105 are considered so
hazardous to the public welfare that proprietors within these fields have no
reasonable expectation of privacy.106 There are, to date, only four industries
that the Supreme Court has deemed closely regulated: liquor sales,107
firearms dealing,108 mining,109 and running automobile junkyards.110
Outside of closely regulated industries, the Court has held that absent
consent or exigent circumstances, the subject of an administrative search
“must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a
neutral decisionmaker.”111 For example, if records are subpoenaed, the
subject of the subpoena has the opportunity to “question the reasonableness
of the subpoena” in court.112
In support of its position that Local Law 146 constitutes an illegal Fourth
Amendment administrative search, Airbnb relies heavily on the 2015
Supreme Court decision City of Los Angeles v. Patel,113 in which the Court
struck down a city ordinance requiring hotel operators to immediately turn
over their records to the police on command and with no opportunity for
precompliance review under the administrative search doctrine.114 In Patel,
the Court held that it is unconstitutional to penalize a hotel owner who refuses
to give police officers access to his or her registry on the spot and with no
prior notice because the owner has not been given an opportunity to have a
neutral decision maker review the demand.115 The Court also held that hotels
are not a closely regulated industry under administrative search
jurisprudence: “[C]lassify[ing] hotels as pervasively regulated would permit
what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”116
Due to certain parallels with Airbnb’s lawsuit—the context of the
hospitality industry, the search involving customer records, and the apparent
lack of opportunity for precompliance review—Patel looms large in the
dispute over Local Law 146.
B. Third-Party Issues
This section discusses whose rights courts will recognize when the
government gains information about an individual through a search of a thirdparty entity. First, this section traces the evolution of the third-party doctrine
and explains how the doctrine affects which parties can bring meritorious
105. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015).
106. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
107. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74 (1970).
108. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
109. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981).
110. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707 (1987).
111. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
112. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
113. 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
114. See id. at 2456; Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 23
115. See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2447, 2453. While it is not necessary that the demand actually
be reviewed if the hotel owner gives consent, if the owner refuses consent, she must be
afforded the opportunity to object. See id. at 2453.
116. Id. at 2455.
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challenges to Local Law 146. Second, this section explains the distinct
theory of third-party standing.
1. History of the Third-Party Doctrine
In an administrative search challenge, the complainant typically must be
the business that was subject to the administrative search rather than an
individual whose records were produced as a result of the search.117 This is
due to the third-party doctrine, under which individual citizens do not have a
protected privacy interest in records that are given to and controlled by a third
party.118 This notion is rooted in Katz, which established that Fourth
Amendment protection extends to areas where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy but that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”119 Another key component of the third-party doctrine is that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from obtaining
information that a person has revealed to a third party, “even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”120 As a result, the government can usually obtain information
provided by citizens to third parties without triggering Fourth Amendment
protections by serving legal process on the third party.121
Following its rudimentary origins in Katz, the third-party doctrine was
solidified in two 1970s cases: United States v. Miller,122 in which the
Supreme Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank
records;123 and Smith v. Maryland,124 in which the Court held that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a phone.125
More recently, the Court considered the limits of the third-party doctrine
in Carpenter v. United States,126 a case involving historical cell-site location
information (CSLI) subpoenaed as a part of a robbery investigation.127 The
Court found that the defendant Timothy Carpenter had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his CSLI, despite the fact that the information was
created, stored, and controlled by his cell phone company—a third party.128
The Court found the third-party doctrine inapplicable in this case because
Carpenter did not voluntarily share his location information with the cell

117. See Hans, supra note 95, at 10–11.
118. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine,
100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 985 (2016).
119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
120. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
121. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
122. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
123. See id. at 442–43.
124. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
125. Id. at 743–44.
126. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
127. See id. at 2210.
128. See id. at 2217.
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phone company and because of the comprehensive and especially revealing
nature of CSLI.129 Some scholars have predicted that this decision will have
a ripple effect and will make it more difficult for the government to access
various types of nonpublic databases.130
The Court split 5-4 with the dissenting justices authoring four separate
dissents.131 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas
and Justice Alito,132 emphasized that property concepts are still integral to
Fourth Amendment rights.133 Because the bank in Miller and the phone
company in Smith were more than merely “bailees or custodians of the
records, with a duty to hold the records for the defendants’ use,” individuals
could not argue that their own personal property had been searched.134
Justice Kennedy found nothing special to distinguish CSLI from other
records that contain personal information but are nonetheless owned by
businesses and can be obtained through serving a subpoena on the
business.135
In a separate dissent, Justice Alito emphasized that the majority decision
“fractures two fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law” by treating an
order to produce specified documents as equivalent to a search, and by
allowing a defendant to object to the search of a third party’s property.136
Justice Alito warned that this would threaten legitimate investigative
practices on which law enforcement officers rely.137 By contrast, Justice
Gorsuch was the only dissenting vote to argue for greater individual privacy
protections than the majority and wholesale abandonment of the third-party
doctrine.138
While the implications of Carpenter are not yet fully understood, the
decision shows that the Court is rethinking strict application of the third-party
doctrine.139 This rethinking is important in the Airbnb context because the
classic application of the third-party doctrine would prevent individual hosts
from claiming a violation of their privacy rights following a search of
Airbnb’s records.
2. Third-Party Standing
Third-party standing is an exception to the rule that a “plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
129. See id. at 2223.
130. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018).
131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
132. Id. at 2223.
133. Id. at 2227–28. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2228.
135. See id. at 2229.
136. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
139. See Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. ONLINE 260, 260.
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relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”140 In certain situations,
third-party plaintiffs can assert constitutional arguments on behalf of
nonparties, provided that there is: (1) a close relationship between the
plaintiff and the parties possessing the right; and (2) some hindrance to the
nonparty bringing a claim of his own.141 This exception gives standing to
businesses to bring constitutional claims on behalf of their clients and
customers. For example, in Craig v. Boren,142 a licensed vendor of 3.2
percent beer was allowed to assert an equal protection claim on behalf of
male customers who were adversely affected by a law allowing women to
purchase 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen and men at age twenty-one.143 In
Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Services,144 Verizon
was allowed to challenge a subpoena that sought the identity of a user on the
grounds that the subpoena violated the user’s First Amendment rights.145
Accordingly, third-party standing is an alternate theory under which home
sharing services could assert the privacy rights of their customers.
C. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act (SCA)146 is a federal statutory
framework that adds an extra layer of responsibility to covered entities in
safeguarding their users’ electronic information and communications from
disclosure.147 The law contains a sliding scale requiring greater protection
for more sensitive types of information, such as the content of messages as
opposed to a user’s basic registration information.148 The provisions of the
statute articulating which entities the SCA covers are considered to be
outdated.149 As written, the SCA covers electronic communications services
(ECS), meaning “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to
send or receive . . . electronic communications,”150 and remote computing
services (RCS), meaning any entity engaged in the “provision to the public
of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system.”151
Regarding the disclosure of information to the government, the SCA
provides that “a provider of remote computing service or electronic
140. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
141. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004).
142. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
143. See id. at 192–93.
144. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003).
145. See id. at 258.
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
147. See In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), 289 F. Supp. 3d
201, 203 (D.D.C. 2018).
148. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222 (2004).
149. Id. at 1213; cf. In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), 289
F. Supp. 3d at 208 (“With technological advances since the enactment of . . . the SCA, the
difference between ECS and RCS has eroded . . . .”).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
151. Id. § 2711(2).
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communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . .
to any governmental entity” without a subpoena or other legal process.152
The flip side is that the law requires an internet service provider to disclose
electronic information protected by the Act to the government if the
government obtains legal process in a form approved by the Act.153
Section 2703 of the SCA discusses customer records.154 The provision
says that the government can use an administrative subpoena authorized by
federal or state statute to compel disclosure of basic customer records
including customer identity and the types of services used.155 For all other
customer records, the government must either obtain a warrant, a court order,
or the consent of the customer.156 Local Law 146 potentially implicates this
provision.
D. The Home and Privacy
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very
core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable government intrusion.’”157 Indeed, “the overriding
respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions
since the origins of the Republic.”158
The special consideration historically given to the home and overnight
lodging are not directly asserted by Airbnb, likely because the privacy of the
home is not directly implicated by Local Law 146, and Airbnb is not a private
citizen with a home. But while this privacy concern is not currently being
litigated, it is an undercurrent of the dispute. Local Law 146 does not directly
authorize any home searches—rather, the law directs the disclosure of
customer records.159 However, these records contain information regarding
the physical homes of New York City residents, in addition to the arguably
commercial activity that periodically goes on within them. In November
2018, a team of twenty law enforcement officers descended on a
condominium tower in Manhattan and issued violations to twenty different
owners, which illustrates how the information contained in the reports
mandated by Local Law 146 could lead to more physical searches of
homes.160
152. Id. § 2702(a)(3).
153. See id. § 2703(b).
154. See id. § 2703.
155. Id. § 2703(c)(2).
156. Id. § 2703(c)(1).
157. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961)).
158. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
159. See supra Part I.D.
160. See Josh Barbanel, New York City Raids Condo Building in Crackdown on Airbnb
Rentals, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2018, 8:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-cityraids-condo-building-in-crackdown-on-airbnb-rentals-1541944153 [https://perma.cc/Q94CTBFN].
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City council members have responded to blowback against regulation of
Airbnb by claiming that the city has no interest in targeting individual
middle- or low-income homeowners who rent out their homes occasionally
for extra income and that, instead, the city is focused on eliminating operators
of de facto illegal hotels with multiple listings.161 But the language imposing
fines for violations of the short-term rental laws makes no distinction
between the two,162 and anecdotal evidence shows the city is not only
targeting large-scale operators.163 Despite the promises of city officials,
Local Law 146 and New York State’s short-term rental laws apply to all New
York City residents, regardless of the scale at which they operate on
Airbnb.164 The proximity of Local Law 146 to the home could further
complicate privacy considerations.
III. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK’S ASSESSMENT OF THE
PRIVACY ARGUMENTS AGAINST LOCAL LAW 146
This Part lays out the privacy arguments that Airbnb and HomeAway
assert in their lawsuits against New York City and explains the district court’s
reasons for its preliminary ruling against the city. First, this Part addresses
the argument that the law creates an illegal Fourth Amendment
administrative search; second, it explains the different approaches that
Airbnb and HomeAway took in addressing the third-party issues; and third,
it discusses the argument that the law violates the Stored Communications
Act.
A. Fourth Amendment Administrative Search
In its lawsuit, Airbnb claims that Local Law 146 is facially invalid because
it requires Airbnb to surrender information to the government with no
opportunity for precompliance review.165 Airbnb argues that “a company’s
common law possessory interest in its own records would have ‘little
practical value’ if the government could commandeer them at will.”166
Airbnb argues that it does not fall into the limited category of closely
regulated industries for which administrative searches are conducted in the
regular course of business, as it is not involved in alcohol or firearm sales,
mining, or automobile junkyards.167 Furthermore, City of Los Angeles v.

161. See Emma Whitford, Airbnb Accuses NYC Lawmakers of “an Attack on the Middle
Class,” GOTHAMIST (Oct. 30, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://gothamist.com/2015/10/30/
sure_drag_tim_burton_into_this.php [https://perma.cc/RX4X-63KT].
162. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2019).
163. See Olivia Zaleski, Airbnb Is Financing a User’s Lawsuit Against New York City,
BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-07-18/airbnb-is-financing-a-user-s-lawsuit-against-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/Z3
BX-WA2D].
164. See MULT. DWELL. § 121.
165. Airbnb Memo in Support, supra note 69, at 15–16.
166. Id. (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)).
167. Id. at 17 n.6.
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Patel explicitly clarified that the hotel industry is not closely regulated;168
therefore, even though home sharing platforms are not exactly the same as
hotels, Airbnb suggests that Patel’s holding weighs in favor of finding that
home sharing is also not a closely regulated industry. As Airbnb argues,
“there is no reason to believe that home sharing platforms pose a ‘clear and
significant risk to the public welfare’ or are ‘intrinsically dangerous.’”169
Airbnb also claims that the provision requiring it to obtain its users’
“consent” before giving over their information should not alter the analysis
because “the government cannot condition the use of private property on a
compelled waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.”170
In response, the City of New York claims that Airbnb is attempting to stand
in the shoes of its hosts and does not have standing to assert claims on behalf
of the hosts.171 The city does not argue that home sharing should be regarded
as a “closely regulated industry,” but instead suggests that Local Law 146
does not implicate Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment rights because Airbnb lacks
a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of rental transactions
belonging to its hosts.172 It asserts that the opportunity for precompliance
review deemed necessary in Patel is therefore unnecessary.173 The city also
argues that Local Law 146’s consent provision—which requires Airbnb hosts
to consent to this disclosure before using the service—is adequate legal
consent.174 If Patel does apply, the city argues that Airbnb’s lawsuit itself
could be deemed to constitute precompliance review as “the Court has never
attempted to prescribe the exact form an opportunity for precompliance
review must take.”175
In an opinion and order granting Airbnb and HomeAway’s request for a
preliminary injunction, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer found that Local Law 146
is likely unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “Existing Fourth
Amendment law does not afford a charter for such a wholesale regulatory
appropriation of a company’s user database.”176 The opinion warned that
“[a] ruling upholding the Ordinance as reasonable would invite
municipalities to make similar demands on e-commerce companies . . . for
the routinized production to investigative agencies of broad-ranging
records.”177 Illustrating potentially troubling scenarios that endorsement of
this law could lead to, the court explained that by similar logic, the city
council could compel online auction services to produce records of all sales
168. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015).
169. Airbnb Memo in Support, supra note 69, at 17 n.6 (quoting Patel, 135 S. Ct. at
2454–55).
170. Id. at 18.
171. See NYC Memo in Opposition, supra note 13, at 7.
172. See id. at 14.
173. Id. at 16.
174. See id. at 12.
175. Id. at 17 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015)).
176. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE),
2019 WL 91990, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan.
31, 2019).
177. Id.
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by New York City residents in order to root out evasions of capital gains
taxes or compel medical providers to produce all patient records on a monthly
basis to help identify “up-coding and other health-care fraud.”178
According to the court, the city’s justification for its proposed collection
of this data—facilitating OSE’s enforcement efforts—is not adequate.179
The court opined that the history of OSE issuing subpoenas to Airbnb and
HomeAway does not show that historical standards and investigative
methods will necessarily be ineffectual.180 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
“disdained justifications like that offered by the City”181 and has held that
“the test of reasonableness is not whether an investigative practice maximizes
law enforcement efficacy.”182 While granting that Local Law 146 would aid
OSE in its mission to identify violators of the short-term rental laws, the court
ultimately found no precedent supporting the conclusion that governmental
appropriation of private business records on this scale, unsupported by
individualized suspicion or any tailoring, qualifies as reasonable.183
As a threshold matter, the court found that the Fourth Amendment does
apply to Local Law 146184 and that Airbnb has a protectable privacy interest
in the records that the law seeks as business records are covered under the
“papers” category of the Fourth Amendment.185 Additionally, the court
found that Patel foreclosed the city’s argument that Airbnb does not have a
privacy interest because the records at issue belong to customers.186 In Patel,
the data sought also originated with guests,187 but the Supreme Court
recognized that the hotel owners had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the guests’ information, which was stored in the hotel’s records.188 The court
noted that there are at least two reasons why businesses in the position of
Airbnb or the hotel owners in Patel would seek to preserve the privacy of
their customers’ information: first, to protect the information from business
competitors and, second, to foster the trust of customers.189 For these
reasons, the court affirmed Patel’s assessment that customer-facing
businesses are not expected to disclose commercially sensitive information
such as customer lists and being compelled to do so is “more than sufficient
to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.”190 While the parties spilled
considerable ink discussing whose rights are at issue under Local Law 146,
the court found the premise that Airbnb’s rights are implicated relatively
178. Id.
179. Id. at *16–18.
180. Id. at *17.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *18.
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *10.
186. Id.
187. For example, the municipal regulation sought names, addresses, and vehicle
information. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015).
188. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *10.
189. Id. at *11.
190. Id. (quoting Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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straightforward.191 However, it did not foreclose the possibility that host
rights are implicated as well.192
Although the city did not argue that home sharing should be deemed a
closely regulated industry, the court clarified that it is not.193 The court found
Patel’s reasoning that the hotel industry does not involve inherently
dangerous operations or have a history of pervasive regulation to be
persuasive, and it ultimately concluded that this “equally applies to the peerto-peer housing market.”194 Thus, Airbnb does not have a diminished
privacy interest in its records by virtue of the nature of the business.195
The court then evaluated the reasonableness of the search under two
related lines of authority: agency investigative subpoenas and administrative
searches.196 Though the parties’ arguments had focused on administrative
searches, the court found that in some ways Local Law 146 acts more like an
agency subpoena in that it requires booking services to produce records to an
agency rather than requiring any physical inspection.197 Ultimately, the two
lines of authority led the court in a similar analytic direction as both require
some form of tailored inspection or request to prevent fishing expeditions, as
well as the opportunity of precompliance review before a neutral decision
maker.198 The court found Local Law 146 lacked both of these important
restraints.199
On the subject of tailoring, the court noted that the scale of the information
to be collected by the city under the ordinance is “breathtaking.”200 As an
example, the court pointed out that in 2016, data from more than 700,000
bookings would have been transmitted to the city under the ordinance.201
“The universality of the Ordinance’s monthly production demand . . . , the
sheer volume of guest records implicated, and the Ordinance’s infinite time
horizon all disfavor the Ordinance when evaluated for reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment.”202 While an agency subpoena must “be sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome,”203 the court found that
Local Law 146 is “the antithesis of a targeted administrative subpoena”204
and “devoid of any tailoring.”205 The court found that the law amounts to
“functional equivalent of a legislative edict mandating that OSE issue an
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at *9–10.
See id. at *10 n.7.
Id. at *12; see supra Part II.A.
Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *12.
See id.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *16, *18.
Id. at *17, *19.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)).
Id. at *16.
Id. at *17.
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identical subpoena to every covered booking service operating in New York
City, every month . . . and extending into perpetuity.”206 Demanding this
information without any factual basis to suspect any particular host, in the
court’s view, fails to meet the standard of specificity.207 Administrative
searches must usually satisfy “a relaxed standard of probable cause.”208 The
court acknowledged that some “suspicionless searches”209 have been upheld
as administrative searches, but only in exigent circumstances not present
here.210
On the issue of precompliance review, the court also found Local Law 146
deficient.211 The court relied on Patel and its recent affirmation that the
subject of an administrative search must have an opportunity for
precompliance review before a neutral decision maker prior to suffering
penalties for refusing to comply.212 The court also found that the city failed
to identify any mechanism for precompliance review under Local Law 146
where a home sharing service could challenge either a demand for data or a
penalty for noncompliance.213 Moreover, the court noted that the ordinance
provides for penalties of up to $1500 per listing for failure to comply, which
“could prove punishing, if not an existential threat, to a booking service.”214
The court rejected the city’s theory that the instant lawsuit could be deemed
precompliance review as the lawsuit only constituted a facial challenge to
Local Law 146 and could not substitute for a challenge to any particular
application of the ordinance.215 While Local Law 146 functions in a manner
distinct from the ordinance at issue in Patel, and does not involve in-person
inspections, the need for precompliance review is the same.
Ultimately, the court’s determination that Local Law 146 likely violates
the Fourth Amendment was based “most notably, [on] the scale of the user
data compelled to be produced, as measured against the precedents that
require that the demands of subpoenas and regulatory searches and seizures
be reasonably tailored and that reject governmental attempts to dispense with
tailoring in the generalized interest of investigative efficacy.”216 Further, the
court emphasized that Fourth Amendment violation was aggravated “because
(1) the user data in question is commercially sensitive and subject to potential
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *13.
209. Id. at *14.
210. Id. at *18. The district court wrote, “OSE’s probe into violations by hosts of the
Multiple Dwelling Laws does not implicate the exigencies (such as the risk that evidence will
disappear if not promptly seized) on which these decisions have relied in upholding searches
despite the lack of individualized suspicion.” Id. Examples of permissible suspicionless
searches include a warrantless search of a student by a teacher and a warrantless search of an
employee’s desk by a public employer. Id. at *14 (first citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987); then citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
211. Id. at *19.
212. Id. at *18–19.
213. Id. at *19.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.

2612

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

disclosure; and (2) the Ordinance’s requirement for monthly productions of
such data is perpetual.”217 Thus, while the lack of opportunity for
precompliance review is important, amending that aspect of the ordinance
would not necessarily salvage the constitutionality of the city’s law.
B. Third-Party Issues
In their separate court filings, Airbnb and HomeAway take two different
approaches to the issue of the third-party doctrine. Airbnb does not
specifically allude to the third-party doctrine and frames its argument as an
assertion of only its own Fourth Amendment rights, though it references its
concern for its hosts’ privacy.218 Conversely, HomeAway directly argues
that it should be able to sue on behalf of its hosts under the doctrine of thirdparty standing.219
In its lawsuit, Airbnb sometimes conflates the concepts of its own privacy
with its customers’ privacy, for example, by asserting that Local Law 146
“requires Airbnb to report on a monthly basis volumes of otherwise private
information about who New Yorkers choose to invite into their homes, where
those homes are located, when and for how long the guests stay, and what
the guests are doing there.”220 While Airbnb embeds its arguments in themes
of a personal privacy violation and ostensibly piggybacks on the more
personal violation its customers would experience, it ultimately argues that
the records at issue are its own regardless of “whether the information
originally comes from users (as was true of the guest book in Patel).”221
Airbnb argues that the relevant Fourth Amendment questions are “whether
the requested information is in Airbnb’s possession and whether Airbnb
maintains it as private.”222
HomeAway argues that Local Law 146 violates both its Fourth
Amendment rights223 and the rights of its customers.224 In support of its right
to assert claims on behalf of its customers, HomeAway argues that it has
third-party standing because it has a close relationship to its customers and
because there is a hindrance to the customers’ ability to protect their own
interests.225 Specifically, HomeAway claims that its customers would be
overly burdened by the economic realities of litigation and would face the
217. Id.
218. See Airbnb Memo in Support, supra note 69, at 16 (“Airbnb’s guests and hosts
reasonably rely on Airbnb to protect their privacy and security.”).
219. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Homeaway.com, Inc.’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction to Preserve the Status Quo at 18, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York,
Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019)
[hereinafter HomeAway Memo in Support].
220. Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 3.
221. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 2, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742
(PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019).
222. Id.
223. See HomeAway Memo in Support, supra note 219, at 15.
224. See id. at 16.
225. See id. at 18.
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possibility of retribution from the city.226 Moreover, it argues that the case
for third-party standing is particularly compelling where personal privacy
rights are involved.227
The city claims that the home sharing services lack standing to assert
privacy claims on behalf of their hosts due to the general principle that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights and cannot be vicariously asserted.228
It argues that third-party standing is inappropriate under the three-part test
from Powers v. Ohio229: “(i) ‘[t]he litigant must have suffered an “injury in
fact”’; (ii) ‘the litigant must have a close relation to the third party’; and (iii)
‘there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or
her own interests.’”230 While home sharing services might meet the second
prong by having a close relationship with their users, the city argues that the
plaintiffs have failed to show an injury to themselves or a legitimate reason
that hosts are hindered from asserting their own privacy rights.231
Furthermore, the city argues that HomeAway’s host-based claims would fail
anyway because hosts lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information requested under the third-party doctrine,232 as they have
voluntarily turned the information over to the home sharing services233 and
have already consented to the disclosure of information.234
Largely ignoring the lengthy discussion of standing in the parties’ briefs
and the differing approaches taken by Airbnb and HomeAway, Judge
Engelmayer chose only to address arguments regarding the rights of home
sharing services rather than the rights of hosts.235 As discussed in Part III.A,
the court determined that the Fourth Amendment rights of home sharing
services are implicated by Local Law 146, as the statute seeks to compel
production of their business records.236
Rather than responding to HomeAway’s theory of third-party standing, the
court placed this comment in a footnote: “Airbnb and HomeAway base their
challenges to the Ordinance solely on the claim that their Fourth Amendment
rights . . . would be abridged. The Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis
accordingly focuses solely on the claim that the Ordinance impairs the rights
of the platforms.”237 It is unclear why the court took this relatively simplistic
view of the standing arguments despite language in HomeAway’s complaint
226. See id.
227. See id. at 19.
228. See NYC Memo in Opposition, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
229. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
230. NYC Memo in Opposition, supra note 13, at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Powers,
499 U.S. at 411).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 9.
233. See id. at 10.
234. See id. at 12.
235. See Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE),
2019 WL 91990, at *10 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir.
Jan. 31, 2019).
236. Id. at *10.
237. Id. at *10 n.7.
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and memorandum in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction
directly asking for relief on behalf of its customers.238 Perhaps the court
intended to avoid the complex constitutional question of whether a thirdparty business can assert Fourth Amendment constitutional claims on behalf
of customers, given that the lawsuit can be decided without this specific
argument.
However, the court hinted that it remains open to a Fourth Amendment
challenge by an individual, notwithstanding traditional third-party doctrine
concerns. In the same footnote, the court wrote, “in theory a user could have
brought a Fourth Amendment claim of his or her own, presumably attempting
to extend the principles of Carpenter to this context.”239 While only
mentioned briefly, this footnote shows the court acknowledging that Local
Law 146 also implicates hosts’ rights. Moreover, following Carpenter, the
court implies that there may be flexibility to argue that these individual
privacy rights deserve Fourth Amendment protection despite the fact that the
hosts shared their information with a third-party and thus can have no
reasonable expectation of privacy under the classic application of Smith and
Miller.240
C. The Stored Communications Act
Finally, Airbnb argues that the Stored Communications Act preempts
Local Law 146241 and that the company would violate federal law were it to
comply with the ordinance because it requires the company to turn over user
information without either a subpoena or valid user consent.242 Airbnb
claims that it could be liable to hosts if it turns over their information.243
While the SCA provides that the government can legally obtain
information covered under the Act via the consent of the subscriber or
customer,244 Airbnb argues that the provision of Local Law 146 requiring it
to obtain disclosure consent from its users is insufficient for two reasons.
First, it argues that the SCA requires the governmental entity itself to obtain
user consent rather than the service provider.245 Second, it argues that the
consent obtained by Airbnb would be invalid since the “consent” is forced
and that allowing the government to mandate that covered entities obtain
consent from users to disclose their information undermines the concept of
consent set forth in the SCA.246 Illustrating its point, Airbnb claims that “if
238. HomeAway stated: “The City’s attempt to force HomeAway to disclose such private
materials violates the Fourth Amendment rights of both HomeAway and its customers. . . .
HomeAway also may vindicate the constitutional rights of its subscribers . . . .” HomeAway
Complaint, supra note 68, at 21.
239. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *10 n.7.
240. See supra notes 122, 124 and accompanying text.
241. Airbnb Memo in Support, supra note 69, at 22.
242. See id. at 24–25.
243. See id. at 25.
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2012).
245. See Airbnb Memo in Support, supra note 69, at 25–26.
246. See id. at 26.
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the City’s position were accepted, it is not clear why the City could not, for
example, require Amazon or any other online platform to obtain blanket
‘consent’ from its customers and then turn over details of their purchases or
other online activity.”247
In response, the city claims that Local Law 146 does not conflict with the
SCA because the SCA does not protect communications that are readily
accessible to the public,248 not all booking services are covered by the
SCA,249 the consent provision of Local Law 146 makes it legal under the
SCA,250 consent is not forced,251 and the SCA does not require governmental
entities to obtain consent directly from the subscriber.252
In its preliminary injunction, the court found that the home sharing sites’
argument that Local Law 146 is preempted by the SCA was “colorable” but
declined to say whether the argument was likely to succeed.253 While
portions of a similar home sharing data-collection law were found to be
preempted by the SCA in a previous case, Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of
Portland,254 the court distinguished Local Law 146 on the basis of its consent
provision, which requires the home sharing sites to obtain the consent of a
user to the disclosure of their information before they can use the service.255
Despite the home sharing sites’ argument that this consent would be invalid
because it is forced, the court found that the plaintiffs had not proved that
hosts would feel coerced to consent.256 Additionally, the court found
relevant the fact that both Airbnb and HomeAway’s current privacy policies
already require hosts to consent to disclosure of their information to legal
authorities when reasonably necessary.257 The court did not acknowledge
that the implications of this consent would drastically change if Local
Law 146 goes into effect. The court was also unpersuaded by Airbnb’s
stance that the SCA requires the government to obtain consent directly from
users rather than through an intermediary.258 Ultimately, the court neither
favored Airbnb’s SCA preemption argument at the preliminary stage nor did
it foreclose the possibility that it would be successful on a fully developed
record.259

247. Id.
248. See NYC Memo in Opposition, supra note 13, at 18.
249. See id. at 20.
250. See id. at 21.
251. See id. at 24–25.
252. See id. at 22.
253. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE),
2019 WL 91990, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan.
31, 2019).
254. No. 3:17-cv-00091-MO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74880, at *11–12 (D. Or. May 11,
2017).
255. Airbnb, Inc., 2019 WL 91990, at *21.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at *22 n.14.
259. Id. at *20.

2616

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

IV. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES
TO LOCAL LAW 146
This Part explores the possibility of individual hosts bringing as-applied
challenges to Local Law 146 or to similar statutes in the future.260 Could an
individual plaintiff challenging this type of search provide a compelling
justification for long-simmering change to the third-party doctrine?
A. Why Individuals Should Be Able to Challenge Data-Collection Laws
When the Second Circuit rules on the preliminary injunction in Airbnb,
Inc. v. City of New York,261 it will only resolve the question of Airbnb’s
Fourth Amendment right as a business to be free from this attempted
administrative search. If the district court’s decision is affirmed, Airbnb
hosts will have been protected from these searches by a corporate proxy
whose interests happen to be closely aligned with their own.262 However, if
the decision is reversed, every single Airbnb host in New York City could
soon see their home sharing records turned over to the city and be subject to
fines if they are found to be renting their home for fewer than thirty days.263
If Airbnb cannot successfully challenge the constitutionality of this search,
would the third-party doctrine prevent hosts themselves from doing so?
Given that hosts are the ultimate targets of the city’s investigative efforts, this
result seems unjust. The following sections discuss how hosts might attempt
to bring a challenge.
B. Third-Party Doctrine Issues
The first hurdle that individuals must surmount is the third-party doctrine.
Prior to Carpenter, the idea that individuals could be successful plaintiffs in
a privacy challenge to Local Law 146 would have seemed misguided since
Airbnb hosts voluntarily handed their information over to Airbnb and
therefore could not be said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information under Smith and Miller.264 This case would be a classic example
of a challenge easily defeated by the third-party doctrine.265 Indeed, several
months prior to the Carpenter decision, a California state court rejected a
similar argument made by HomeAway on behalf of its customers.266
260. Airbnb is currently pursuing a separate lawsuit against the City of Boston, asking the
court to enjoin several new short-term rental laws, including a data-collection law. See
Complaint of Airbnb, Inc. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of
Boston, No. 18-cv-12358 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2018).
261. Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE), 2019 WL 91990 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-288 (2d. Cir. Jan. 31, 2019).
262. See supra Part III.B.
263. See supra Parts I.B, I.D.
264. See supra Part II.B.1.
265. Hans, supra note 95, at 10.
266. See City & County of San Francisco v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901,
912 (Ct. App. 2018) (“The Fourth Amendment does not protect information voluntarily
disclosed to a third party, which is why the SCA created a set of Fourth-Amendment-like
protections for customer information stored on ISPs.”).
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But Carpenter opened up the possibility that the Supreme Court may be
willing to question the wisdom of the third-party doctrine in the digital age,
as it is nearly impossible to function in today’s society without sharing
information digitally. The Carpenter Court found that the third-party
doctrine did not apply to CSLI because the information was too
comprehensive and was not voluntarily shared in the literal sense.267 Justice
Gorsuch, in dissent, leaned even further toward protecting consumer privacy
and argued that the Court should not sidestep the third-party doctrine but
should instead rethink the doctrine completely268: “Just because you have to
entrust a third party with your data doesn’t necessarily mean you should lose
all Fourth Amendment protections in it.”269
This skepticism of the third-party doctrine is not new. Professor Orin Kerr
has explained that “the verdict among commentators has been frequent and
apparently unanimous: The third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but
horribly wrong.”270 In United States v. Jones,271 Justice Sotomayor wrote a
concurring opinion that questioned the third-party doctrine in its entirety:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties. . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.272

Despite this sentiment, Sotomayor joined Carpenter majority’s opinion,
which preserved the third-party doctrine and created a limited exception for
CSLI.273 The Carpenter majority did not hint at what types of personal data
held by third parties might also skirt the traditional third-party doctrine, and
Justice Alito, in dissent, fretted that this uncertainty would guarantee a
“blizzard of litigation.”274 Against this background, Carpenter could be
regarded as the first major crack in the third-party doctrine, and likely not the
last.
The third-party doctrine carveout created in Carpenter dictates that
obtaining an individual’s personal CSLI constitutes a search implicating the
person’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though the information was
arguably “shared” with a third party.275 Investigators must obtain a warrant
before accessing a wireless customer’s CSLI276 rather than merely a court

267. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018).
268. Id. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564
(2009) (footnote omitted).
271. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In Jones, the Court held that law enforcement officers violated
the Fourth Amendment when they attached a GPS tracker to the bottom of a suspect’s vehicle
without a warrant. Id. at 404.
272. Id. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
273. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
274. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 2212 (majority opinion).
276. Id. at 2221.
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order as the investigators did in the case.277 Careful not to seismically disrupt
the Fourth Amendment landscape, the Court wrote that “[t]he Government
will be able to use subpoenas to acquire records in the overwhelming
majority of investigations . . . . [A] warrant is required in the rare case where
the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third
party.”278 The Court found that individuals have a legitimate privacy interest
in their personal CSLI due to its “deeply revealing nature . . . , its depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature
of its collection.”279
As the majority of the Court does not appear ready for an all-out challenge
to the third-party doctrine, individuals fighting Local Law 146 would do
better to argue for an exception to the doctrine similar to that recognized in
Carpenter. Home sharing records may not be as frighteningly invasive as
CSLI, but the way in which the city plans to use these records presents its
own undesirable consequences that the Supreme Court may not have
intended when it created the third-party doctrine.
C. The Dangerous Combination of the Third-Party Doctrine
and Data-Collection Laws
Though, with the exception of Carpenter, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the third-party doctrine in the context of criminal
investigations, it has never blessed the combination of the third-party
doctrine and an administrative search regime.280 As Professor Adam
Lamparello has explained, “Together, the third-party doctrine and
administrative search exception can easily become a one-two punch that
strikes a significant blow at the heart of basic privacy protections.”281 This
is especially true in the context of data-collection laws, which can amass a
large volume of information about individuals who were not previously
suspected of any legal violation, with little effort by the government.
Several differences in procedure distinguish the situation Timothy
Carpenter faced from the situation individuals will face under Local Law
146. Carpenter’s CSLI records were obtained via subpoena as part of a
criminal investigation in which he had been identified as a suspect.282 At
trial, he moved to suppress the records for having been obtained without a
warrant.283 In contrast, Airbnb and its customers readily admit that host
records can be subpoenaed through Airbnb as part of an investigation,284 but
277. Id. at 2212.
278. Id. at 2222.
279. Id. at 2223.
280. See Hans, supra note 95, at 38–39.
281. Adam Lamparello, City of Los Angeles v. Patel: The Upcoming Supreme Court Case
No One Is Talking About, 20 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 135, 138 (2015).
282. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
283. See id.
284. See Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, Nos. 18 Civ. 7712 (PAE), 18 Civ. 7742 (PAE),
2019 WL 91990, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (stating that New York City has issued ten
subpoenas to Airbnb and eventually obtained compliance with them following objections, and
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they object to the fact that, under Local Law 146, the extra step of obtaining
a court-ordered subpoena is skipped over. Individuals searched under Local
Law 146 will be searched regardless of individualized suspicion since, in an
administrative search regime, the criteria necessary for a search are provided
by statute.285 Hosts could argue that, notwithstanding the government’s
ability to subpoena their records from Airbnb, a data-collection statute that
takes the form of a monthly dragnet implicates the Fourth Amendment rights
of individuals whose data is collected.286
The fact that Local Law 146 authorizes an automatic administrative search
rather than an optional law enforcement tool is also significant. While the
threat of a subpoena represents a possibility that records may be searched
following approval by court order, pursuant to the needs of a specific
investigation, data-collection statutes like Local Law 146 create a certainty
that customer records will be searched without being relevant to a particular
investigation. Even the administrative search regime at issue in Patel
authorized searches of hotel records only when demanded by police, but it
did not require all of the data to be turned over to the government on a set
timetable.287 Hosts could argue that this more powerful and pervasive form
of search necessitates greater protections for searched individuals.
Additionally, under Local Law 146, not only is the search automatized, but
so is the penalty. If the reports provided by Airbnb reveal that a property has
been rented for less than thirty days, this evidence could be enough to impose
a fine automatically. Though it has not been stated by the OSE directly,
Local Law 146 will not likely be used to procure individual search warrants
based on the data—more logically, it will cut out the need for physical
inspections entirely.
The city currently handles violations of the short-term rental and shortterm advertising laws through the New York City Office of Administrative
Trials & Hearings (OATH).288 An alleged violator receives a summons with
the proposed penalty and an optional hearing date.289 As with a parking
ticket, the recipient can pay the fine by mail or contest the charge in an

has issued five subpoenas to HomeAway and obtained full compliance), appeal docketed, No.
19-288 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2019); Airbnb Complaint, supra note 12, at 17; see also Sara O’Brien,
Airbnb Subpoenaed by New York City for Data on Listings, CNN (Feb. 19, 2019, 7:00 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/19/tech/airbnb-subpoena-new-york-city/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L5UX-B6Z8] (reporting Mayor Bill de Blasio’s announcement that New
York City subpoenaed approximately 20,000 host records from Airbnb following the district
court’s order.).
285. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part III.A.
287. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
288. See Hearings, N.Y.C. OFF. ADMIN. TRIALS & HEARINGS, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
oath/hearings/hearings.page [https://perma.cc/ASF8-44MF] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019)
(listing the city agencies whose summonses are handled by OATH, including the Mayor’s
Office of Special Enforcement).
289. See Resolving a Violation, N.Y.C. OFF. SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT, http://www1.nyc.gov/
site/specialenforcement/enforcement/how-to-resolve-a-violation.page [http://perma.cc/CP5JF7Z2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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informal hearing.290 Aside from the capacity of OATH to handle this volume
of summonses, there is no apparent bar to the city transferring Airbnb user
information directly to a summons if the report shows that user to have rented
a property for fewer than thirty days or advertised a rental of fewer than thirty
days. Granted, this less formal adjudication stems from the fact that the
short-term rental laws only carry the possibility of civil rather than criminal
penalties—but the lesser procedural protections for individuals are still
striking. Automatic data collection combined with these swift and
mechanized penalties could spur a reexamination of the rights at issue, as it
seems particularly harsh to deny Fourth Amendment rights to individuals
who lack other procedural protections.
D. The Home and Privacy
Another aggravating element of Local Law 146 that hosts are better
positioned to highlight than Airbnb is that broad data-collection statutes are
especially improper in the context of the home.291 The specific data that New
York City seeks to collect represents activity within private homes.292 Some
of these details are arguably quite personal, such as the decision to
periodically open space in the home to paying guests and the number of days
that a resident is away from home each month.293
Throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the privacy of the home
has been zealously guarded. Private dwellings are “ordinarily afforded the
most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”294 For a search of a private
home, “a warrant traditionally has been required.”295 The interior of a home
is “the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected
privacy.”296 The reasonableness of the minimal expectation of privacy that
exists in the home has deep roots in the common law.297 The Court has
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance
to the house.”298 The Court also has held that guests have protectable Fourth
Amendment privacy rights in hotel rooms299 and that overnight guests share
the same expectation of privacy in their hosts’ homes.300
While special protections for the home were once based on common-law
trespass,301 a physical intrusion into the home is no longer necessary in order
for a Fourth Amendment search to occur following Katz.302 In Kyllo v.
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United States,303 investigators used thermal imaging technology to detect the
presence of high-intensity lamps being used to grow marijuana in the
defendant’s home.304 The Supreme Court held that when “the Government
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”305 While data disclosures from home sharing sites are distant in
nature from thermal imaging technology, the analogy may not be so farfetched. Both are law enforcement devices not in general public use that are
being used to explore otherwise unknowable details of a home. Furthermore,
Kyllo held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained.”306
In Smith, the Supreme Court considered concerns about home privacy in
the context of the third-party doctrine.307 The Court ruled that information
voluntarily revealed to a third party, even within the context of the home,
such as dialing numbers on a personal home phone, triggers the third-party
doctrine, which means that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in this information.308 And without a reasonable expectation of privacy, no
search occurs when law enforcement accesses this information.309 However,
Smith involved the investigation of one specific crime and the installation of
a pen register on one citizen’s phone.310 Thus, as discussed, it is
distinguishable on the basis that it did not involve mass data collection
without individualized suspicion.
As the district court determined, under Local Law 146, neither hosts nor
Airbnb have the opportunity to obtain precompliance review of document
requests.311 The absence of an opportunity to obtain precompliance review
indicates that home sharing is being treated as a closely regulated industry.312
This absence further implies that home sharing is not just a business—but a
business that is extremely hazardous to the public welfare.313 While it is
indisputable that home sharing is a business that generates profits for
individuals, it is also indisputable that home sharing creates a hybrid between
a home and a business.314 Hosts could argue that their homes should still be
regarded as homes, even if they are periodically rented out, and that the act
of listing a private dwelling on Airbnb should not mean that a person
automatically waives special protections usually afforded to the home. At
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the very least, it should not automatically subject that home to a rare form of
automatic search.
A challenge by hosts would depend on reconsideration of the third-party
doctrine,315 with special urgency generated by present circumstances. Local
Law 146 involves (1) mandatory consent to disclosure as a prerequisite to
using a commercial service,316 (2) governmental access to comprehensive
private business records on a monthly basis in perpetuity,317 (3) the
government learning information about private homes through these
records,318 and (4) the government’s use of this information to impose
automatic fines.319 Accordingly, this law enables the government to conduct
invasive searches that are certain to affect thousands of individuals. Further,
the third-party doctrine denies these individuals Fourth Amendment rights
that would provide grounds to challenge these searches, thereby allowing
unreasonable searches to go unchecked. While Airbnb and HomeAway may
be effective proxies for their customers given that their interests are closely
aligned, in the future, customers should not have to rely on the will of
corporate protectors to challenge data-collection laws.
CONCLUSION
New York City has had a contentious relationship with Airbnb from the
start, and the local government is determined not to let the undeniable
popularity of the home sharing model rule the day. The passage of Local
Law 146 is a high-water mark for home sharing data-collection laws in the
United States, spurred by flagrant noncompliance with the existing ban on
short-term rentals. The collection of non-anonymized data of all Airbnb user
transactions on a monthly basis takes the administrative search doctrine to a
new level, and endorsing this approach would dramatically alter the online
privacy landscape. However, regardless of the result of Airbnb’s challenge
to the law and the court’s weighing of its privacy rights as a business, the
important question of individual Airbnb customers’ privacy rights will likely
remain unanswered. Airbnb hosts in New York City or their counterparts
who face future data-collection laws elsewhere should challenge traditional
third-party doctrine assumptions by bringing as-applied challenges, and
claim that indiscriminate data-collection statutes violate their Fourth
Amendment rights. While the third-party doctrine could frustrate this type
of challenge, Carpenter has shown that the doctrine itself is poised for
change.
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